“All Roads Lead to Rome” When It Comes to Summary Judgment on Maine Whistleblower Claims, Says First Circuit

The First Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed summary judgment in a retaliation suit under the Maine Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA), finding no merit to the employee’s claim that her termination was motivated by complaints she had made about a coworker’s workplace behavior. Before getting to the merits in Theriault v. Genesis Healthcare LLC, though, the First Circuit addressed Maine’s new framework for analyzing WPA claims and clarified that, although the framework may have changed the way evidence of retaliation is presented at the summary judgment stage, it did not change the level of proof needed to defeat summary judgment. 

Central to the dispute in Theriault was the import of the Law Court’s 2015 decision in Brady v. Cumberland County. In Brady, the Law Court announced that it would no longer use the three-part McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to analyze WPA claims on summary judgment. Instead, the Law Court explained that WPA claims should be analyzed in a unitary way to determine whether the evidence, as a whole, would allow a jury to conclude that an adverse action was motivated by retaliatory intent. 

The question in Theriault was whether the Law Court’s new framework, which collapsed the way evidence of retaliation is presented at the summary judgment stage, also collapsed the scope of evidence to be considered on summary judgment. Theriault argued that it did. She argued that, after Brady, a plaintiff need only establish a “prima facie” case of retaliation to survive summary judgment and that a court should therefore only consider a plaintiff’s evidence when faced with an employer’s summary judgment motion. The First Circuit rejected that argument and found that Brady’s elimination of the burden-shifting framework in no way limited the scope of evidence to be considered on summary judgment in WPA retaliation cases. It explained that, although the new “Maine-specific retaliation paradigm” requires plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the prima facie showing that must be made is not the minimal prima facie case that plaintiffs had to show under McDonnell Douglas, but rather a body of evidence that is “sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment.” A court in a WPA retaliation case may therefore recognize any evidence that the employer had a lawful reason for taking an adverse action, as well as any evidence that the proffered reason is pretext. In short, said the Court, “all roads lead to Rome” under Maine’s new retaliation paradigm and a plaintiff must “adduce precisely the same quantum of proof that she would have had to adduce to defeat summary judgment under the McDonnell Douglas framework.”

Turning to the merits of Theriault’s retaliation claim, the First Circuit found that the trial court appropriately followed Maine’s analytic framework for WPA retaliation cases and, based on an appraisal of the entire record that included evidence from Genesis Healthcare about its reasons for termination, agreed with the trial court that Theriault failed to produce sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that her termination was motivated by retaliatory intent.

Maine’s Law Court Blows the Whistle on McDonnell Douglas

Maine’s highest court has closed out the year with two notable decisions involving the state’s Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA).  The decisions revise the method for analyzing WPA cases on summary judgment and, as a result, are likely to have impacts that are more procedural than substantive. 

When a party files a motion for summary judgment, they are essentially arguing that no factual dispute exists with respect to the key aspects of the case and that a court can therefore decide the case as a matter of law, without having to go to a trial.  In employment discrimination cases, courts have for years relied on a framework developed by the U.S. Supreme Court to determine whether or not a factual dispute exists that would prevent summary judgment from being awarded. The framework, known as McDonnell Douglas, generally sets out a procedure for presenting evidence of discrimination.  The procedure involves shifting burdens, where the employee must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination, which the employer must then rebut with an explanation as to why it had legitimate reasons for any actions it took.  Assuming the employer provides that explanation, the burden then shifts back to the employee to point to sufficient evidence in the record that would allow a jury to conclude that the employer’s conduct was nonetheless motivated, at least in some measure, by discrimination. 

In Brady v. Cumberland County (November 10, 2015) and Cormier v. Genesis Healthcare, LLC (December 15, 2015), the Law Court announced that it would no longer use the McDonnell Douglas framework for adjudicating WPA cases on summary judgment.  In brief, the Law Court noted that because of the way a WPA claim is defined under Maine law, an employee must produce evidence of causation—i.e. evidence that the employer had an unlawful motive for taking an adverse action—as part of his or her prima facie case.  This is in contrast to claims under Title VII, where employees are not required to produce evidence of causation until the third step of the McDonnell Douglas framework—after the employer has produced a legitimate non-discriminatory explanation for its actions. Noting this difference between the WPA and Title VII, the Law Court concluded that, for WPA cases, the second and third steps of the McDonnell Douglas framework are duplicative.  Consequently, rather than employing the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the Law Court explained that when analyzing WPA cases on summary judgment, it will consider evidence in a “unitary way and simply determine whether the record as a whole would allow a jury to reasonably conclude that the adverse employment action was motivated at least in part by retaliatory intent.” 

In a sense, then, the Brady and Cormier decisions do not signal a significant change.  In WPA cases, employees and employers will still need to present the same evidence to prevail on summary judgment; the difference is that the Law Court will not go through the exercise (or require the parties to through the exercise) of sorting that evidence through a burden-shifting framework.  Instead, in a nod to judicial efficiency, the Court will simply consider all the evidence at once to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to suggest that an adverse employment action was motivated at least in part by protected activity.

Maine Law Court Weighs In Again on Whistleblower Claims

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, acting as the Law Court, recently issued a decision reiterating the scope of protected activity under the Maine Whistleblowers’ Protection Act.  The decision is a win for employers and clarifies that an employee’s subjective belief that there has been a violation of law is not enough to bring a report about the alleged violation within the protections of the WPA – the employee’s belief must also be objectively reasonable.

The issue in Galouch v. Department of Professional and Financial Regulation was whether reports made by a Maine Bureau of Insurance employee – Patricia Galouch – qualified as protected activity where the reports related to concerns Ms. Galouch had about a court reporter.  The court reporter was under contract with the Bureau to provide certain services, and Ms. Galouch believed the reporter had breached the terms of her service agreement.  Ms. Galouch believed these breaches violated certain rules governing the Bureau’s procurement of services, and she reported her concerns to her supervisor.  The supervisor directed Ms. Galouch to refer contract issues to the Bureau’s contract administrator and instructed her to not address the contract issues herself, as they fell outside her job responsibilities.  Ms. Galouch, however, continued to communicate with the court reporter directly. Soon thereafter, the court reporter terminated her contract with the Bureau and explained she could no longer tolerate Ms. Galouch’s behavior.  The Bureau placed Ms. Galouch on administrative leave while it investigated allegations that she had exceeded the authority of her position.  As a result of the investigation, which was subsequently expanded to include other performance issues, the Bureau terminated Ms. Galouch’s employment.

The key issue for the Law Court was whether Ms. Galouch’s report concerning the court reporter’s contract qualified as protected activity under the WPA.  More specifically, the issue was whether Ms. Galouch had “reasonable cause” to believe that the court reporter’s conduct was unlawful.  The Law Court found that even if Ms. Galouch subjectively believed the reporter’s conduct was unlawful, there was no evidence demonstrating that a reasonable person would have believed so.  While acknowledging that the WPA “does not require an employee be able to cite to a particular statute or rule that may have been violated,” the Law Court held that Ms. Galouch’s “subjective belief alone is insufficient to meet the WPA’s ‘reasonable cause’ requirement.”