The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has announced a new Strategic Plan for 2018 – 2022. The EEOC approved the new plan unanimously and began implementing it last month.
As explained by the EEOC in its announcement, the Strategic Plan serves as a framework for the Commission to achieve its mission through “strategic application of the EEOC’s law enforcement authorities, preventing employment discrimination and promoting inclusive workplaces through education and outreach, and organizational excellence.” For each of these three objectives, the EEOC has identified specific outcome goals as well as performance measures to track the Commission’s progress toward those goals.
The new Strategic Plan continues many of the same priorities found in the EEOC’s previous plan. For example, the plan continues to prioritize systemic investigations and lawsuits, which the Commission believes have greater strategic impact due to their wide influence on industries, occupation, and geographic areas. According to the EEOC, though, the new Strategic Plan sharpens the agency’s focus and updates emerging issues of concern. The Strategic Plan’s performance measures contain perhaps the best evidence of this updated focus, which include greater emphasis on obtaining targeted, equitable relief when resolving charges, and ensuring that charge investigations and conciliations meet certain quality criteria.
Although the EEOC has already begun implementation of the new Strategic Plan, it is not doing so at full capacity: the five-member Commission still has two vacancies, and it is not clear when (or if) President Trump’s nominees for those vacancies will be confirmed.
Showing posts with label employment discrimination. Show all posts
Showing posts with label employment discrimination. Show all posts
EEOC Releases New Strategic Enforcement Plan
Thursday, March 8, 2018
Maine’s Law Court Blows the Whistle on McDonnell Douglas
Tuesday, December 22, 2015
Maine’s highest court has closed out the year with two notable decisions involving the state’s Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA). The decisions revise the method for analyzing WPA cases on summary judgment and, as a result, are likely to have impacts that are more procedural than substantive.
When a party files a motion for summary judgment, they are essentially arguing that no factual dispute exists with respect to the key aspects of the case and that a court can therefore decide the case as a matter of law, without having to go to a trial. In employment discrimination cases, courts have for years relied on a framework developed by the U.S. Supreme Court to determine whether or not a factual dispute exists that would prevent summary judgment from being awarded. The framework, known as McDonnell Douglas, generally sets out a procedure for presenting evidence of discrimination. The procedure involves shifting burdens, where the employee must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination, which the employer must then rebut with an explanation as to why it had legitimate reasons for any actions it took. Assuming the employer provides that explanation, the burden then shifts back to the employee to point to sufficient evidence in the record that would allow a jury to conclude that the employer’s conduct was nonetheless motivated, at least in some measure, by discrimination.
In Brady v. Cumberland County (November 10, 2015) and Cormier v. Genesis Healthcare, LLC (December 15, 2015), the Law Court announced that it would no longer use the McDonnell Douglas framework for adjudicating WPA cases on summary judgment. In brief, the Law Court noted that because of the way a WPA claim is defined under Maine law, an employee must produce evidence of causation—i.e. evidence that the employer had an unlawful motive for taking an adverse action—as part of his or her prima facie case. This is in contrast to claims under Title VII, where employees are not required to produce evidence of causation until the third step of the McDonnell Douglas framework—after the employer has produced a legitimate non-discriminatory explanation for its actions. Noting this difference between the WPA and Title VII, the Law Court concluded that, for WPA cases, the second and third steps of the McDonnell Douglas framework are duplicative. Consequently, rather than employing the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the Law Court explained that when analyzing WPA cases on summary judgment, it will consider evidence in a “unitary way and simply determine whether the record as a whole would allow a jury to reasonably conclude that the adverse employment action was motivated at least in part by retaliatory intent.”
In a sense, then, the Brady and Cormier decisions do not signal a significant change. In WPA cases, employees and employers will still need to present the same evidence to prevail on summary judgment; the difference is that the Law Court will not go through the exercise (or require the parties to through the exercise) of sorting that evidence through a burden-shifting framework. Instead, in a nod to judicial efficiency, the Court will simply consider all the evidence at once to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to suggest that an adverse employment action was motivated at least in part by protected activity.
Supreme Court Will Hear Three Employment Discrimination Cases
Thursday, October 9, 2014
The United States Supreme Court held its traditional first of October meeting to determine which cases it will hear during the 2014-15 term. The Court has accepted three employment discrimination cases.
Young v. United Parcel Service. The question is whether the employer has to accommodate pregnant employees who are unable to handle some of the physical requirements of the job, i.e. UPS employees who have to carry heavy boxes. The UPS employee has appealed to the Supreme Court claiming that her needs while pregnant were not accommodated by UPS’s “pregnancy-blind policy”; the policy limited accommodations to employees who were injured on the job, who were defined as “disabled” and who had lost their DOT certification.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. “Did Abercrombie and Fitch discriminate against a Muslim job applicant when she was rejected based on her desire to wear a head scarf at work?” The significant question is whether the employer has to have “actual knowledge” that a practice is religious before it is required to accommodate the practice in the workplace. Abercrombie claims that the job applicant did not explicitly indicate that her scarf had religious meaning.
Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC. This case involves the extent to which courts may enforce the EEOC’s duty to conciliate cases pre-litigation. Mach moved for summary judgment alleging the EEOC had failed to fulfill its statutory duty to conciliate the case in good faith. There is a split among the Appellate Circuits as to whether or not the EEOC’s duty to conciliate is reviewable by a court.
Young v. United Parcel Service. The question is whether the employer has to accommodate pregnant employees who are unable to handle some of the physical requirements of the job, i.e. UPS employees who have to carry heavy boxes. The UPS employee has appealed to the Supreme Court claiming that her needs while pregnant were not accommodated by UPS’s “pregnancy-blind policy”; the policy limited accommodations to employees who were injured on the job, who were defined as “disabled” and who had lost their DOT certification.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. “Did Abercrombie and Fitch discriminate against a Muslim job applicant when she was rejected based on her desire to wear a head scarf at work?” The significant question is whether the employer has to have “actual knowledge” that a practice is religious before it is required to accommodate the practice in the workplace. Abercrombie claims that the job applicant did not explicitly indicate that her scarf had religious meaning.
Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC. This case involves the extent to which courts may enforce the EEOC’s duty to conciliate cases pre-litigation. Mach moved for summary judgment alleging the EEOC had failed to fulfill its statutory duty to conciliate the case in good faith. There is a split among the Appellate Circuits as to whether or not the EEOC’s duty to conciliate is reviewable by a court.
Labels:
Abercrombie & Fitch,
accommodate pregnant employees,
EEOC,
employment discrimination,
muslim job applicant,
pregnancy-blind policy,
religions practice accommodation; Mach Mining,
statutory duty to conciliate
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